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ABSTRACT 
This paper analizes the impact of the globalization of Mediterranean 
horticultural products (MHP). From 1850 onwards, the Mediterranean 
countries took advantage of the new opportunities that arose to increase 
their production and trade in MHP. The Spanish case shows how the high 
elasticity of supply with respect to prices helps to explain the enormous 
increase of its production and trade in MHP, that became the most dynamic 
sector of Spanish agriculture. The analysis of the counterfactual case of the 
non-existence of US MHP emphasizes the cost of this increasing 
competition to the traditional producers from the end of the nineteenth 
century. 
 
KEYWORDS: Globalization, International Markets, Spanish Economic 
Development, International Trade, Mediterranean Horticultural Products. 
 




Este artículo analiza el impacto de la globalización de los productos de la 
hortifruticultura mediterránea. A partir de 1850 los países mediterráneos 
aprovecharon las nuevas oportunidades que surgieron para incrementar su 
producción y comercio de este tipo de productos. El caso español muestra 
cómo la alta elasticidad de la oferta con respecto a los precios ayuda a 
explicar el enorme incremento en la producción y comercio de estos 
productos, que se convirtieron en el sector más dinámico de la agricultura 
española. El análisis del caso contrafactual de la no existencia de la 
producción norteamericana de productos hortofrutícolas mediterráneos pone 
de relieve los costes  de la creciente competencia en los mercados 
internacionales para los productores tradicionales desde mediados del siglo 
XIX.  
 
Palabras Clave: Globalización, Mercados Internacionales, Desarrollo 
Económico Español, Comercio Internacional, Productos Hortofrutícolas 
Mediterráneos.   3
 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the most important elements of the globalization process that began in the 
middle of the nineteenth century was the trade boom generated by the fall in transport 
costs between markets and the move towards free trade
1.  When analysing commodity 
market integration for agricultural products, emphasis has above all been placed on the 
impact of the “invasion” of Europe  -particularly by cereals coming from America and 
the Russian Empire-  for agriculture in that continent, the way it responded through its 
trade policies or, in general, the effect of this invasion on its economic development
2. 
However, for the Mediterranean countries, and notwithstanding  the fact that the 
analysis carried out from the above viewpoint is very important from the imports side 
and with respect to the impact of this “invasion” on the agriculture of these countries, it 
is also of central importance to study their participation in international trade as 
exporters of those products in which they not only enjoyed clear comparative 
advantages, but also benefited from a centuries-long tradition of production, namely 
olive oil, wine and fruits and vegetables.  Indeed, a series of recent papers have been 
devoted precisely to this problem, focusing on international competition in these 
products and the effects of the trade policy implemented by their importers.   
Thus, with respect to wine and olive oil, the literature has pointed above all to the 
intra-Mediterranean competition (including the discriminatory trade policy applied by 
France) or the trade barriers erected in the American continent to protect its nascent 
national industries
3.   
As regards Mediterranean horticulture, attention has been drawn to the 
competition between California and these Mediterranean countries, together with the 
damage caused to the latter by the emergence of this US State as a world power in these 
products; such damage has been described as serious and, furthermore, as having made 
a significant contribution “to the prolonged crisis in Mediterranean agriculture”. Finally, 
                                                 
1 O’Rourke and Williamson, ”When did globalisation”; Findlay and O’Rourke, “Commodity Market 
Integration”. 
2 O’Rourke and Williamson, Globalization; O’Rourke, “European Grain Invasion”; Tracy, Agriculture. 
3 Pinilla and Ayuda, “Political Economy”; Ramon-Muñoz, “Specialization”.   4
it has been argued that “the story of the globalization of Mediterranean horticulture 
echoes familiar themes found in the literature on the European grain invasion”
4. 
In this sense a scheme has been proposed of factor and commodity flows between 
old and new areas. In the first phase of this scheme, the competition of the New World 
in grain products expelled the labor factor of the “old agriculture” of the Old World 
towards urban activities or towards the New World itself. In the second, this 
competition and the new urban demand drove farmers from the “old” to the “new 
agriculture” (fruit and nut cultivation) in the Old World. In its final phase, competition 
from the New World in these new agricultural products even ended-up implying the exit 
of workers from the “new” Mediterranean agriculture of the Old World
5. 
Against this background, the aim of this paper is to proceed further with this last 
line of research, revising some of the conclusions that have been reached up to now and, 
therefore, analyzing the impact that the globalization of the production and marketing of 
Mediterranean horticultural products had for its traditional producers.   
>From our point of view, the globalization process did not lead to a prolonged 
crisis of European Mediterranean horticulture. Rather, this was by some way the most 
dynamic part of its agricultural sector, as well as being the most competitive from an 
international point of view. By contrast to the earlier-mentioned scheme of factor and 
product mobility, Mediterranean horticulture in Europe, at least until the outbreak of the 
Second World War, did not end-up losing productive factors as a consequence of 
globalization; instead, with the exception of very specific products such as dried fruits, 
it continued to absorb these factors from the old agriculture. 
Therefore, the main effect of transatlantic competition was essentially the loss of 
the North American market to European exporters and the impact that the increase in 
New World production could have on prices. However, by contrast to the well known 
case of the invasion of Europe by New World grain, to which the old continent 
responded not only with tariff barriers, but also with an important process of 
technological change, the invasion that the New World suffered from European 
Mediterranean horticulture not only met with a response of technological modernization 
and marketing innovation, but also with a high degree of tariff protection. 
                                                 
4 Morilla, Olmstead and Rhode, “Horn of Plenty”, p. 346. 
5 Morilla, Olmstead and Rhode, “International Competition” , p. 200-202.   5
In order to achieve the objective we have set ourselves, that is to say, to 
demonstrate the dynamic character of European Mediterranean horticulture, as well as 
its sensitivity to the signals that the market sent out during the globalization process and 
its high competitiveness in some market sectors, we have divided our work into three 
sections, which follow on from this introduction. 
We first analyse the evolution of the international trade in Mediterranean 
horticultural products, also placing this in relation with production, basing ourselves on 
the reconstruction of its main magnitudes for the first third of the twentieth century. In 
this way, our aim is to demonstrate that in the European markets the Mediterranean 
producers not only maintained their export levels, but actually saw them increase during 
a substantial part of the twentieth century. 
All this has led us to evaluate and test two distinct models for the production and 
marketing of these types of products, namely that of the traditional producer countries, 
in our case Spain, and that of the New World, specifically California.  In summary, our 
interest lies in determining what were the sources of competitiveness of both types of 
producers, with an attempt being made to understand the different types of success that 
they enjoyed in the distinct markets, that is to say, the UK and Western Europe and the 
North-American markets.  Our working hypothesis coincides with that described in 
Ramon Ramon-Muñoz for the case of olive oil, namely that specialization, following 
the Heckscher-Ohlin approach, is produced in function of the respective comparative 
advantages
6.  Thus, whilst Californian horticulture compensated its high wage costs 
with the highly intensive use of capital, technological change and new marketing 
techniques, that of the Mediterranean countries took advantage of low wages in order to 
obtain products that were price competitive, although normally of a lower quality and 
with a significantly less sophisticated marketing techniques. The weakest point for these 
countries was their relative scarcity of capital and, consequently, the high cost of 
money. Furthermore, the different spatial location of producers and consumers also 
played a relevant role in explaining their distinct positions in the international markets, 
as a consequence of the differentials in transport costs. 
As we try to indicate, these two patterns of specialization, in accordance with their 
respective endowments of resources, degree of economic development and  ‘foreign 
                                                 
6 Ramon-Muñoz, “Specialization”.   6
market access’, generated different results for distinct products
7.  Having said that, we 
find that in general the damage caused by Californian horticulture had a greater affect 
on the loss of the North-American market and its impact on international prices than on 
the loss of very significant market shares in the northern European markets. 
Finally, we use the Spanish case in order to evaluate the impact that globalization 
had on its Mediterranean horticulture. To that end, we study the evolution of its foreign 
trade figures, propose a bi-equational model of export demand and supply and examine 
the counterfactual case of the non-existence of this type of production in the New 
World. 
COMPETING IN A GLOBAL MARKET 
In the first half of the nineteenth century the production and trade in 
Mediterranean horticultural products (fresh fruit, such as oranges, lemons, peaches or 
table grapes; dry fruits, such as raisins; nuts, such as almonds; and fresh vegetables, 
such as tomatoes, peppers or onions) was concentrated to a very significant extent in the 
countries lying on the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean Sea. Whilst 
there was also an important production of these types of products in Asian Far East 
countries, more particularly in those areas which enjoyed appropriate ecological 
conditions, this production was not the subject of significant foreign trade. In the 
majority of Western Europe, these products were considered as exotic, arriving in the 
market in limited amounts. 
However, the international trade in fruits and horticultural products enjoyed an 
extraordinary increase from the middle of the nineteenth century and the first third of 
the twentieth, with this implying an increase in its share of the total trade in agricultural 
products. This increase in the volume of trade was due to commodity market 
integration, what Kevin O’Rourke and Jeffrey Williamson define as globalization, and 
outward shifts in both the import demand and export supply curves
8. 
The increase in the consumption of Mediterranean horticultural products in the 
countries that were more advanced in their industrialization process, with this increase 
coming about through a gradual change in their traditional diets, was key in explaining 
the export potential that had been made available to the producer countries. This 
                                                 
7  Redding and Venables, “Geography”, pp. 1-2, define  country’s ‘foreign market access’ as their 
location relative to sources of import demands. 
8  O’Rourke and Williamson, “When did globalisation”, pp. 25-26.   7
increase in consumption took place essentially as a consequence of the increase in 
income in these industrialising countries. This is made clear by the case of oranges in 
the UK, given the high income elasticity they exhibit, above all in the second half of the 
nineteenth century
9. Thus, there was an evident displacement of the demand curve 
driven by an increase in income.  
Furthermore, we argue that there was a coexistence in the displacements of both 
the supply and the demand curves, and that neither of them was independent of the 
other
10. The consideration of the increase in demand on the part of the industrialised 
countries as a factor exogenous to the Mediterranean countries, although taken 
advantage of by them as a motor for their exports, is not sustainable if we take into 
account that the expansion of these exports required an allocation of factors to make it 
possible which, in some cases, implied important changes in the production function. 
These changes went much further than the re-allocation of factors to those products with 
a more solvent demand; rather, they implied a profound agricultural transformation on 
those areas that had a greater participation in international trade. Furthermore, this 
agricultural transformation process did not take place in an isolated manner with respect 
to the production directed towards the interior of these countries. Instead, it tended to 
incorporate similar processes of technological change, such as the introduction of 
irrigation to significant areas that were, up to that time, dedicated to dry farming, 
together with a more intensive use of new fertilisers, mechanisation, the fight against 
crop pests and blights, changes in crop varieties, etc. 
This process of productive transformation also took place in a context of 
increasing competition in international markets. During a significant part of the second 
half of the nineteenth century competition was basically intra-Mediterranean, with this 
determining the distinct specialization amongst the different countries (the strong 
positions acquired by some countries in certain products, such as Spain with oranges, 
Italy with lemons and Greece-Turkey with raisins, were significant). However, from the 
end of the nineteenth century onwards the excellent trade expectations of these products 
increased the international competition in two ways: first, the progressive addition of 
“new Mediterranean countries” from within its geographical area (the North African 
countries or Mandatory Palestine) and, secondly, the addition of other countries from 
                                                 
9  Pinilla and Ayuda, “Right shifts”. 
10 On this theme for the Mediterranean countries, see Federico, “Oltre frontiera” and “Comercio exterior”.   8
outside that area, located in temperate zones (the USA, Brazil, Australia, South Africa). 
Colonists of European origin played a determining role in the promotion of 
Mediterranean agriculture in all these areas. The competitor with the greatest capacity to 
threaten the relevant market position occupied by the long-standing Mediterranean 
producers was undoubtedly the USA and, more specifically, its Californian agricultural 
sector. 
The main importing nucleus was made up of the more developed countries, with 
the UK clearly at the head of them and with the other main importers of fruits and 
vegetables being France, Germany, The USA, Canada, Belgium, Holland and 
Switzerland. The most outstanding change in the make-up of this group turns on the fact 
that the development of these crops in the US meant that it lost relevance as an 
importer, despite being the highest consumer of these products. The consequence of this 
development was that its internal market began to be supplied by Californian 
agriculture, as well as by other parts of the country that also tended to specialize in these 
kinds of crops. The combination of a modern and efficient agriculture, excellent 
marketing and significant protectionism had the effect of excluding from the US market 
a good part of the fruit and vegetables production coming from exporter countries. The 
available data on the international trade in these types of products suffers from the 
central drawback of starting in the twentieth century (indeed, at different dates 
according to the product) in such a way that it is difficult to capture what happened in 
the second half of the nineteenth century. In the light of the British foreign trade 
statistics, it appears reasonable to point to the most outstanding feature of this period as 
being the sharp increase that took place in the imports of these products
11. It is also 
reasonable to indicate that as the nucleus of industrialized countries expanded, the UKs 
weight in this trade within Europe began to decrease. 
The available data for a range of products (see Appendix, tables A-H) show that 
until the Second World War years Europe occupied a central position as the main 
importer of Mediterranean horticultural products, exceeding 75 percent of the world 
market in almost all of them. The evolution of this trade during the first third of the 
twentieth century was characterised by a number of novel aspects, with the most 
outstanding being the decline or disappearance of the US as an importer, and the 
                                                 
11 Pinilla and Ayuda, “Right shifts”.   9
emergence (real or only statistical, given that this trade was not previously recorded) of 
markets in Asia or South America, normally supplied by neighbouring producers.  
As regards the exporters, it was initially the countries lying on the northern shore 
of the Mediterranean that tended to cover the international markets in these products. 
The expansion of Spanish or Italian exports clearly illustrates the point to which certain 
traditional producers took advantage of the opportunities that had been opened to them. 
With the passing of the years, and particularly from the beginning of the twentieth 
century, these countries had to face increasing competition from a significant number of 
countries lying outside Europe. However, this did not give rise to a serious collapse on 
the part of European exports. In absolute terms, they grew at a variable amount 
according to the general tendency that existed for each product (thus, during the period 
1910-30, the European exports of oranges grew by 67 percent, of lemons by 1 percent 
and of table grapes by 34 percent). On the basis of the limited evidence available to us 
(that is to say, relating to only four products, albeit with citrus fruits, which represented 
by far the most important part of this trade, being included amongst them) it can be said 
that European exports increased in those products whose demand followed a more 
dynamic pattern of behavior, and levelled out or fell otherwise. 
Turning from the analysis of the evolution of trade in absolute terms to that of 
world market shares, what is particularly noteworthy is the emergence of these new 
producers who, in general terms, caused the European participation to decline. The 
emerging exporters of oranges were the US, Brazil, South Africa, Japan and, above all, 
Palestine which, following Spain, was the second most important exporter at world 
level. With respect to lemons, only one European country, Spain, defied the Italian 
hegemony, so that continental participation was not affected. As regards table grapes, 
the increase of Algerian and US exports stands out, with this also being the case with 
the US and Australia for raisins.  
However, this data hides the main impact that increasing competition had on the 
traditional Mediterranean producers, namely the loss of the US market, which began to 
be supplied in great part by its own agriculture
12. This further implies that the figures 
we have cited undervalue the international trade in Mediterranean  horticultural 
products, in that US imports tended to be substituted by internal trade, in such a way 
that the fall in these imports tended to be compensated by greater increases in exports to   10
other markets. Nevertheless, they also undervalue the damage caused to traditional 
exporters not by the fall in their exports (we have seen that, save for the case of raisins, 
this did not take place), or by the loss of relative participation (which was generally 
mild), but rather as a result the possibilities that would have existed of access to the 
biggest market in the world in the circumstances where US agriculture had not been 
successful in achieving a position where it could supply its own market.  
SPECIALIZATION MODELS:  BETWEEN HECKSCHER-OHLIN AND 
KRUGMAN 
The aim of this section is to explain this increasing competition in the 
international markets, illustrating it with the cases of two highly competitive 
agricultural sectors, those of California and of Spain. 
Our working hypothesis is that both these sectors adopted specialization models 
in the production of Mediterranean horticultural goods that were coherent with their 
endowment of productive factors and, therefore, of competitive advantages. 
Thus, California compensated the relatively high costs of its labor with a lower 
costs of land and, above all, of capital, whilst Spain, with a lower relative endowment of 
land and, by contrast, abundant labor, had to contend with the central problem of the 
high cost of capital. Both types of specialization led to different orientations: whilst 
California placed emphasis on quality, understood above all as high product 
standardization, innovation in some of them, accredited brands and advanced marketing, 
Spain, although trying to follow the paths of technological change that had been 
introduced in California, could compete thanks to the enormous advantage it had in the 
price of the labor factor. 
Paradoxically, the technological advantage enjoyed by California was not 
sufficient to achieve a competitive position in the majority of the international markets, 
especially in those of the more developed areas of Europe. By contrast, it captured 
almost all the US internal market, receiving significant support to that end from its 
strong protectionism, as well as the neighbouring Canadian market. In certain cases, for 
example that of oranges, the threat for Spain in markets such as the UK came more from 
other areas of the Mediterranean, which had had more success in imitating the 
Californian pattern and enjoyed a greater availability of capital, than from the other side 
                                                                                                                                               
12  See the fall of American imports in Morilla, Olmstead and Rhode, “Horn of Plenty”.   11
of the Atlantic. In summary, the two main world producers of Mediterranean 
horticultural products followed models of specialization that led them to different 
competitive positions in function of the market segments they fed and the geographical 
location of those markets. 
In mid-nineteenth century Spain, the production and export of Mediterranean 
horticultural products was insignificant. Even in the irrigated areas, the predominant 
crops were wheat, vines and olives. The main objective was to obtain regular production 
that was dependent to only a limited extent on rainfall which, in a country as arid as 
Spain, is very irregular. Logically, a secondary objective was also to increase 
production. Oranges and other fruit bearing trees were normally cultivated on the limits 
of the irrigated small-holdings, with regular orchard plantations being extremely rare. 
Furthermore, in some areas there were small market gardens dedicated to the summer 
production of vegetables, essentially for self-consumption, or to obtaining more 
commercial products, such as various textile fibres (hemp, flax or white mulberry leaves 
to feed silkworms). 
The development of an agriculture that was commercial in nature and which 
specialized  in Mediterranean horticulture required a significant number of changes with 
respect to the more traditional style of agriculture. This indicates that we are not 
considering simply a response to exterior stimulus, but rather a process in which the 
dynamism of supply, driven by the differential return of these crops with respect of the 
traditional ones, was crucial
13. The first obstacle faced in Spain was water: without 
irrigation, hardly any of the crops in question are viable in the Iberian Peninsula. Thus, 
although expansion could take place in some zones through a change of land use in 
irrigated areas, it was also necessary to increase the supply of water so as to make 
possible the transformation from dry land to irrigated farming
14. The increase in the 
supply of water was based on the public sector assuming the construction of significant 
regulation and distribution projects (reservoirs and canals), together with the digging of 
wells for water extraction. The very retarded character of any commitment to hydraulic 
civil engineering projects (the last decade of the nineteenth century), and the low level 
of investment on the part of the central government, limited its impact in those areas 
that were more specialized  in Mediterranean horticulture. As a result, the key role was 
                                                 
13 This is the opinion of Garrabou, Fals dilema, p. 107 for the case of the orange.     12
played by private initiative taking advantage of underground water using the available 
modern technologies and the energy derived from fossil fuels
15. The characteristic pluri-
crop farming gave way to farms that specialized  in a more reduced number of products. 
However, and quite apart from water, the development of these products required a 
series of technical innovations, such as the more intensive use of fertilizers, first guano 
and later inorganic fertilisers, the introduction of new varieties, the fight against plant 
pests and diseases, etc. 
The expansion of this form of agriculture took place above all in the areas 
closest to the Mediterranean littoral, given that these areas had the most appropriate 
ecological conditions for the cultivation of the crops in question. Furthermore, they 
enjoyed an advantageous geographical situation for access to the international markets. 
Its growth had already reached spectacular levels in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, although the absence of complete statistical data does not allow us to estimate 
this with precision. The main crop of this type, the orange, serves as an excellent 
example to gauge the early dynamism of this sector. In the Spanish provinces where the 
cultivation of oranges was particularly important, Castellón and Valencia, the area 
dedicated to this fruit increased from 1,249 hectares in 1860 (just ten years after the 
time when it is considered that its cultivation in regular plantations had begun) to 9,880 
in 1890. In these two provinces, the figure had reached 36,705 hectares by 1922 and 
58,773 hectares by 1932, whilst at this latter date there were almost 75,000 hectares 
under production in the whole of Spain. The production data, although available only 
for the second expansionary phase that started at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
is also illustrative: between 1902 and 1932 the production of oranges and almonds had 
doubled; that of lemons had multiplied by five; whilst that of peaches and apricots had 
doubled and quadrupled, respectively (since only 1910)
16. Logically, in the totality of 
Spanish agricultural production (including livestock and the forestry sector) its relative 
importance had increased considerably: if in 1890 it had been estimated that the 
                                                                                                                                               
14 Up to 1900 the cultivation of the orange in onetime dry land areas that had been transformed into 
irrigated areas was much more important than its cultivation in the traditional market gardens. 
15 Calatayud and Martínez-Carrión, “Cambio técnico”, p. 27, have shown that of the 29,443 irrigation 
motors that existed in Spain in 1932, some 76% used steam, generator gas, petrol, pyronaphtha or electric 
energy. In Valencia, the modernization of the traditional systems of irrigation ditches and the 
improvement of its management also had some importance. See Calatayud, “Regadío”.  
16 Data of Garrabou, Fals dilema and Grupo de Estudios de Historia Rural, Estadísticas Históricas.   13
participation of fruits and horticultural products was 7.4 percent, in 1931 it had reached 
14 percent, with productivity doubling in the same period
17. 
The main comparative advantages of Mediterranean horticultural production in 
Spain were the low costs of the labor factor and a reasonable knowledge of cultivation 
techniques, given that the trees and plants in question, although they had not been the 
subject of systematic commercial exploitation, had been present in Spanish agriculture 
for centuries. The main problems were the capital-intensive needs and the high price of 
money. To this should be added the low capacity to organise the industry in a 
cooperative basis, which led to the external control of transport and commercialization, 
the high risk of the investment, the climatic risks, such as the frequency of frosts, and 
the low level of general economic development in Spain. 
From amongst all these, we are interested in highlighting the high price of 
money given that, in our view, this was probably one of the key aspects that 
differentiated the evolution of Mediterranean horticulture
18. Account should be taken of 
the fact that the capital needs were high for the development of some of the most 
relevant crops
19. In the most important of these, the orange, we should recall not only 
the initial investment in preparing the land, the purchase of the trees or the opportunity 
cost until these bore their first fruits, some five years, but above all the transformation 
of dry land into irrigated farming that was carried out in the majority of cases through 
the digging of wells. This, apart from being extremely costly, carried a high risk, in that 
it was possible not to strike water
20. If around 1880 the time necessary to obtain the first 
profits was estimated at some ten years, we can evaluate the importance of the loans 
system and the cost of money in making possible the expansion of intensive 
agriculture
21. From that time onwards, the differential of return with dry land farming 
                                                 
17 Grupo de Estudios de Historia Rural, “Notas”, pp. 243-251.  
18 This is also the opinion of Mateu and Calatayud, “Evolución”, pp. 112-116, for oranges. In the same 
sense, see Palafox, “Expansión”, p. 332 and “Tardía industrialización”. 
19 The cultivation of oranges, when compared to that of cereals, vines, olives or vegetables, was less labor 
intensive and more capital intensive, above all because of the high cost of water extraction and 
preparation of the distribution infrastructure, as well as the cost of its maintenance. See Roncalés, 
“Propiedad”, p. 191. 
20 Calatayud, “Economía”, p. 177. 
21 Millán, “Inicis”, pp. 142-143. This was also the crucial problem for the development of citrus fruits in 
southern Italy, where the necessary loans were also very expensive. See Lupo, Giardino, p. 80. 
Calatayud, “Expansió”, pp. 48-53, has indicated how even during the second half of the nineteenth 
century the needs for the working capital (fertilisers) requirements of the export –based agriculture in 
Valencia were financed by recourse to usurious moneylenders.    14
was very important
22. The low degree of economic development in Spain was reflected 
in the similarly insufficient development of a modern financial system. Whilst a modern 
banking system, albeit quite scattered, had began to operate in the cities from the 1850s, 
the presence of these institutions in the rural areas was practically nil. This determined a 
virtual monopoly for private moneylenders who established a system of informal credits 
in which the predominant features was usury, the oscillation of interest rates in function 
of the guarantees of the borrower, generally very high, and the personal character of the 
relationships between lenders and borrowers. The high rates of interest also led to the 
accumulation of land on the part of the moneylenders as a consequence of default in 
payment
23. The limited supply of credit and the elasticity of demand in the credit market 
therefore determined very favourable conditions for the lenders. 
The resulting high rates of interest and their oscillation in function of the net 
worth of the borrower acted as an incentive for the substitution of capital for labor when 
this was possible. More importantly, it erected significant entry barriers against those 
who were not capable of obtaining the necessary credit. In the case, for example, of the 
orange, this meant that the participation of the proprietors in their own expansion was 
conditioned by the size of their farms, with medium and large-scale properties 
predominating in this process. Small proprietors tended to participate more in the 
expansion of orange production within existing irrigated land than in the transformation 
from dry land to irrigated farming, given that the credit needs were higher in the latter. 
Even so, the high return of this type of crop ended-up by involving almost all the social 
sectors in its expansion, although this serious problem undoubtedly slowed down the 
expansion process itself
24. 
From the beginnings of the twentieth century, the cooperative movement became 
the principal mechanism to support the participation of the small proprietors in this 
                                                 
22 In 1881 the return per hectare in Valencia was 2.48 times higher than the average of all crops taken 
together and approximately double that of any other irrigation-based crop. See Roncalés, “Propiedad”, pp. 
186-197. 
23 Eloquent proof of the difficulties in gaining access to non-usurious credit in order to finance this 
transformation is provided by the practice of owners becoming indebted through a formula dating from 
the Ancient Regime and called “ventas a carta de gracia” or “ventas con pacto de retro” whereby they 
sold the land upon the maturity of the loan to the moneylender for the amount of loan received if this had 
not been previously repaid. See Calatayud, “Expansió” and  Roncalés, “Propiedad”. The percentage of 
cases in which the obligation to sell for non-payment was actually enforced could reach very high levels. 
For example, in the case of the region of Murcia, during the years 1900-1920, between 50 percent and 85 
percent of such loans concluded in this fashion, whilst from 1920 onwards that percentage fell to between 
20 percent and 50 percent. Note that the final sale value under this system was normally lower than the 
real market value. See Martínez-Soto, “Tela de araña”, pp. 197-201) .   15
expansion, or to provide even more incentives to the medium and large-scale 
proprietors. Spanish cooperatives were orientated essentially in two directions: 
providing loans at interest rates that allowed for a break with the usury system, and the 
collective purchase of inputs, above all fertilisers. The creation of societies of small and 
medium-sized proprietors provided another opportunity for these to dig wells and, in 
this way, share the main capital investment necessary to develop orange production in 
old dry land farming areas
25. The widely explained case of oranges was not at all 
atypical. In the table grape exporting area of Almeria, the non-existence of a modern 
credit system meant that the capital needs of the producers were covered by private 
moneylenders, exporting firms or shipping companies who provided payments in 
advance to the producers
26. 
The weakness of any institutional activity to support the development of export-
based agriculture should also be highlighted. This is so not only because of its low 
capacity to motivate the increase in irrigated lands through hydrological regulation 
projects, but above all, and in contrast to the US, because of the almost nil contribution 
to technological innovation in these types of crops made by the agricultural research 
centres
27. 
This agricultural system was complemented by an industrial transformation in 
which the wholesaler purchased the crop from the farmers while it was still on the trees 
and became responsible for its collection, cleaning, classification and packaging. These 
wholesalers subsequently sold on to foreign intermediaries or shipping companies who 
financed the campaign through payments in advance
28. Once the fruit was loaded on 
board, Spanish participation disappeared. Only in the case of sales to France were 
commission sales to the destination markets of any importance. 
Turning to the situation in the US, the development of intensive agriculture in 
California followed different patterns and was motivated by somewhat different 
reasons. In this case, it was the fall in interest rates that determined its very significant 
                                                                                                                                               
24 Roncalés, “Propiedad”, p. 202; Garrido, “Conreu”. 
25 Garrido, Treballar. 
26 Sánchez, Integración, pp. 398-401. 
27 It is surprising that the main agricultural research centre in the area with the greatest specialization in 
exports (the Granja Escuela Experimental de Valencia) did not carry out any research into the cultivation 
of the orange. See Calatayud, “Economía”, pp. 123 and 135. 
28 Palafox, “Estructura”.   16
development between 1890 and 1914
29. The key factor was the access to cheap credit 
generated through the capacity of local savings and, above all, to a modern banking 
system centred on San Francisco and which, had a branch network that covered an 
extensive area running from Seattle to Los Angeles. Growers of fresh fruit and 
vegetables also received production credit from cooperative associations, fertilizer 
companies and seed and plant dealers
30. 
Success also rested on two other factors: access to a very extensive market and 
the complementary nature between agricultural development, on the one hand, and 
manufacturing, commercial and financial development, on the other
31. 
The possibility of competing in the markets of the East received a decisive 
impulse from the fall in the costs of rail transport, as well as its improvement resulting 
from the more widespread use of refrigerated wagons
32. 
Expansion was extremely rapid, in such a way that by 1919 production was 
exceeding the amount obtained in 1889 by between five and twenty times, depending on 
the type of product. This truly formidable increasing output took place not only through 
the expansion of the area under cultivation, but also as a result of similarly spectacular 
increases in productivity. 
Another distinctive features of the expansion of Mediterranean horticulture on 
the US West Coast was the high degree of organization of its producers. Organizing  in 
a cooperative manner and integrating with the California research centres, these 
producers were not only capable of leading technological change in terms of seeds or 
varieties, but also innovated in a decisive manner in the area of marketing through the 
establishment of selection processes, standardization, preparation and conservation of 
production which led to the creation of commercially accredited brands and the control 
of product distribution in the markets of the eastern US
33.  
Modern publicity techniques were employed not only to achieve this increase in 
demand, but also to orientate consumers towards a preference for Californian 
                                                 
29 Rhode, “Learning”, p. 778. 
30 Federal Trade Commission, Report, pp. pp. 12-14 and 481-488. 
31  Carter, Randsome and Sutch, “Agricultura”. 
32 In 1889 the transcontinental tariffs for fruits were only 35 percent of those of 1880. Very similar 
reductions had taken place for nuts and for dried fruits. See Rhode, “Intensificación”, p. 135. The number 
of refrigerated railcars increased from 600 in 1891 to 33,644 in 1907 (Dimitri, “Contract”, p. 194). On the 
economic impact of mechanical refrigeration in agricultural products in the US, see Goodwin and Craig, 
“Mechanical Refrigeration”.   17
varieties
34. The innovating character of Californian marketing was capable of displacing 
the demand curve, introducing new products such as raisin bread or orange juice into 
consumption habits. 
The importance of producer associations was such that a total of just three 
orange co-operatives marketed oranges equal to 63 percent of the 1935 US production 
for fresh distribution (more than 90 percent of Californian production). The control of 
distribution on the part of producers was similarly important in the case of other fresh 
fruits
35. 
 The high degree of organisation amongst the producers also allowed them to 
apply intense collective action to achieve a substantial increase in US tariffs during the 
initial phases of development of their production. This had the effect of limiting or 
simply impeding the entry of imports that had traditionally supplied their markets and 
which were themselves undergoing a strong expansionary process. The degree of 
protection and its effects were not uniform, although its role has been considered as 
important in providing an impulse to Mediterranean agriculture in California. In 
general, it has been proposed as a case of infant industry protection. For Mediterranean 
exporters the cost of protection must have been very high, given that during the crucial 
expansionary years of US production the ad valorem rate normally increased to more 
than 65 percent in the case of almost all products
36. 
Two such different types of agricultural development led to results that, although 
apparently paradoxical at first sight, are in fact perfectly understandable. Thus, we can 
maintain that whilst, in general terms, Californian production ended-up by triumphing 
in its internal market with respect to a significant number of Mediterranean horticultural 
products, and was similarly successful in the Canadian market, it had very limited 
success in the more competitive European markets, such as those of the UK, France or 
Germany. The type of product in which it specialized  was directed, outside the US, to 
what might be considered as a very high quality market segment, that is to say, one that 
was characterised by a product with accredited guarantees, standardization, 
commercialisation through a significantly reduced number of well-known brands and a 
                                                                                                                                               
33 Morilla, Olmstead and Rhode, “Horn of Plenty”, pp. 324-325. 
34 Faugeras, Oranges. 
35 Federal Trade Commission, Report , pp. 7-9, 30-32,  and 663-667. 
36 Olmstead and Rhode, “Competencia”, pp. 176-187; Morilla, Olmstead and Rhode, “Horn of Plenty”, 
pp. 321-323;  Bauer, “Foreign Production”, p. 3.   18
very high price. From this perspective, success in the US market could also be 
understood on the basis of the high per capita income that was being achieved in that 
country. Tariff protection was essential for many products in their initial phases of 
capturing the internal market. In some cases, such as that of table grapes, in which 
foreign production continued to be very competitive, there was even recourse to a 
simply prohibition of imports between 1924-34, using the excuse of the presence of 
Mediterranean fly larvae in some consignments exported to New York
37. 
By contrast, Spanish production continued to enjoy hegemony in those lines that 
had been developed in the markets of western Europe. Spanish oranges were not as 
standardised as those coming from California and could, in some cases, present defects 
but, in general, and at least until production and exports reached very high levels from 
1926 onwards, they did not suffer from serious quality problems
38. Their price was 
considerably lower than that of their Californian counterparts, in such a way that during 
the Spanish export season practically no Californian oranges reached the UK. Rather, 
they began to enter at the end of the Spanish season and during all the summer, thanks 
to the development of late varieties in California and good conservation techniques
39. 
When from the mid-1920s onwards there was a deterioration in the quality of 
Spanish fruit as a consequence, first, of exporting consignments containing a high 
percentage of oranges that had been blighted by frost and, secondly, of the poor harvests 
of the 1930s, it was Palestine that began to compete strongly with Spain and take 
                                                 
37 On this theme, see Sánchez, Integración, pp. 407-413. The ban on Spanish imports coincided with 
significant overproduction between 1922 and 1925 and a marked fall in prices. For Ritter and Guttfeld, 
“World Production”, pp. 376-377, this ban formed part of the steps taken to stabilise markets and prices. 
Account has to be taken of the fact that until 1910 it had not been possible to achieve late varieties in 
California that were capable of competing with Spanish imports, and that from that time the producers 
intensified their campaign to obtain greater protection (Morilla, Olmstead and Rhode,”Horn of Plenty).  
38 The poor quality of European fruit was a traditional argument used by the protectionist lobbies in the 
USA and it was employed extensively in the US tariff hearings. Reference was essentially made to 
problems of cleanliness (the fruit was mixed with stems, soil and general dirt), the appearance of 
defective examples and insufficient classification (Morilla, Olmstead and Rhode, “International 
Competition”, p. 213). Quality problems did not emerge in the public debate in Spain until the sharp 
increase in production, resulting from the expansion of the markets, probably gave rise to serious 
problems. In the case of oranges the quasi-monopoly situation enjoyed by Spain until the beginning of the 
century and the less than demanding attitude of the consumer meant that this problem was not relevant. 
Concern for the state of maturity of the exported oranges and for the effects of the frosts began to emerge 
in 1900. From the middle of the 1920s a regulation began to be established aimed above all at avoiding 
the export of frost-damaged oranges which, although sold at a cheaper rate, were affecting the consumers’ 
image of exports in general (Abad, Historia de la Naranja, pp. 65-69 and 305-306; Intelligence Branch of 
the Empire Marketing Board, Oranges, p. 16). Some contemporary analysts have insisted that the quality 
problems of the exported oranges only arose in the middle of the 1920s as a consequence of the dramatic 
increase in exports and the good commercial opportunities (Font de Mora, Comercio , pp. 301-302)    
39 Font de Mora, Comercio, p. 258.   19
advantage of the situation
40. The production of this country, which had been growing 
extremely rapidly since the 1920s thanks to the impulse provided by Jewish colonists 
and the availability of an impressive flow of external capital from the same source, had 
also benefited from its superior quality (thanks to better climatic conditions), and clear 
gains in competitiveness from the mid-1920s
41. The system of imperial preferences 
established by the UK in 1932 basically benefited South Africa, given that Palestine 
was excluded. However, South African production did not compete with that of Spain to 
reach the UK summer market; rather, it competed with Brazilian production in the mid 
and lower markets segments, with the upper market segment being occupied by 
Californian production. When Spanish exports became difficult with the outbreak of the 
Spanish Civil War in 1936, Palestine enjoyed a better position to replace the shortfall 
42. 
However, not all products fit easily into the proposed scheme, that is to say, of 
low prices and low quality for Spain versus high prices and high quality for the US. 
Thus, for example, Spanish table grapes not only displaced the Italian product from the 
US market from the beginning of the twentieth century, but also maintained a strong 
position in the high quality segment of that market until the ban on its import in 1924. 
Its high quality derived from the special natural conditions for its cultivation found in 
the Almeria region of Spain, together with its capacity to be stored for lengthy periods 
and its good preparation for conservation, which allowed the exporting season to be 
extended for various months beyond the harvest. Something similar occurred in the case 
of onions where, despite their high price in the US market, they nevertheless sold well 
thanks to their superior quality. In this regard, we can also cite the case of paprika, 
whose triumph in the international markets was based on the quality of the Spanish 
product
43. 
The relationships between exports and production for various countries in 
question provides very clear information on the above-mentioned results. In general, we 
can state that the leading countries in the international trade in the different  
                                                 
40  Instituto Valenciano de Economia, Economía Citrícola, p.143 
41  Metzer, “Economic Growth”. 
42 Neumark, Citrus Industry, p. 169; Wulfert, Citrus Fruits. The explosive growth in the production of 
oranges in Palestine is made clear by the fact that this represented just 11% of agricultural output in 1920-
25, but no less than 50% in 1932-35. This country’s adoption of modern Californian techniques was very 
important (Metzer, Divided Economy, pp. 145-149). 
43 For table grapes: Ritter and Guttfeld, “World Production”, pp. 299-310; Chaminade, Production, p.186; 
Sanchez,  Integración. For onions: (United States Tariff Commission, 1929, 30-31). For paprika: 
Martinez-Carrion, “Agricultores”.   20
TABLE 1.TRADE SHARES (exports as percentage of production) (%)    
         
  1909-1913 1925-1928 1929-1932 1933-1935  
1929-
1932 
Oranges      Table  grapes 
Spain 60.5  65.1 72.2 93.2 Spain  28.2 
Italy 31.6  49.0 30.0 31.9 France  21.2 
USA 5.9  7.8 8.7 6.8 Italy  19.4 
Brazil n.a.  n.a. 3.0 8.9 USA  3.4 
Japan 7.3  8.2 7.8 12.3 Raisins   
Palestine
a n.a.  n.a. 77.0 77.0 Spain  21.1 
Algeria n.a.  28.7 23.5 37.4 Greece 56.3 
South Africa  n.a.  n.a. 67.8 69.4 USA  31.6 
Lemons      Persia  48.0 
Spain 9.5  29.0 32.7 49.6 Turkey  20.5 
Italy 71.1  60.0 53.4 63.6 Australia  54.1 
USA 2.2  3.7 3.2 3.5    
         
aOranges: Palestinian production : Instituto Valenciano de Economía, Economía, p. 
48.    
Source: Appendix. Tables A-H.       
 
Mediterranean horticultural products had high rates of openness; that is to say, a very 
high relationship between exports and production or, stated in another way, a clear 
orientation towards  the foreign sector (Table 1). By contrast, in the US, world leader in 
the production of some of these products, the percentage of exports with respect to 
production was very low, with the proximity of its enormous internal market and its 
difficulties in competing in foreign markets determining these result. If we subtract its 
exports to Canada, this export percentage would be insignificant in almost all cases
44. 
Although by the 1930s the US had become the leading world producer of oranges, 
lemons and grapes, in no case did its exports of these products exceed 10 percent of 
production, whilst its competitors were achieving levels of more than 50 percent. 
Logically enough, this result was not determined exclusively by orientation to the 
foreign market.  The internal consumption of each country was also a significant data, 
and in more backward countries it is understandable that this internal consumption was 
relatively much lower. Only in the case of raisins, the product which, as we stated 
earlier, enjoyed the greatest international success for Californian agriculture, could 
orientation to foreign markets outside the US be regarded as appreciable, although it 
                                                 
44 Between 1922 and 1927 Canada accounted for 29 percent of the US exports of grapefruits, 70 percent 
of lemons, 73 percent of oranges and 90 percent of peaches. Cuba was the main destination for fresh 
vegetables (Hollingshead and Wakefield, Handbook, p. 7). In 1924-28, Canada accounted for more than 
65 percent of the grape exports (Moriarty, Foreign Trade, p. 81)   21
was still somewhat lower than that of various of its main competitors, such as Greece or 
Australia. 
In summary, we have seen how different endowments of productive factors also 
led to different forms of specialization, very much in line with that forecast by the 
Heckscher-Ohlin theory of international trade. However, this led to the opening-up of 
apparently paradoxical competitive possibilities. If a combination of high technology 
and innovative marketing, but with high prices, could not overcome a certain 
technology gap, clearly backward marketing techniques and low prices, then it is 
necessary to consider in greater detail precisely what had occurred. From our point of 
view, this essentially has to do with two variables: the structure of production costs of 
Mediterranean horticulture, and the degree of economic development and income levels 
of the countries that represented the main markets for this production. 
Considering first the structure of production costs, we can count on evidence 
which, whilst limited, is sufficient for us to tentatively advance a hypothesis. The 
example of oranges exported to the UK market (Table 2) highlights that the Spanish 
advantage rested on lower cultivation costs, similar preparation costs despite a certain 
technological backwardness and, above all, much lower transport costs
45. It would 
appear to be clear, therefore, that in the context of high volume and low unitary value 
products the transport costs were key and, in this sense, proximity to the consumer 
market is an advantage that is difficult to better
46. If to this we add markedly lower labor 
costs, then the competitive position of Spain becomes even stronger
47. Finally, the high 
                                                 
45 Coinciding with this diagnosis was the opinion of a contemporary analyst, who also pointed to the 
efforts made in Spain during the 1920s and 1930s to introduce early and late varieties, as well as to 
extend the season and standardise production (Webber, Citrus Fruits, pp. 94-95) 
46 Although Italian orange production suffered from a weak competitive position compared to Spain in 
markets such as those of the UK and France, given its higher prices and worse productive and commercial 
structures, it had its main markets in neighbouring or proximate countries such as Switzerland, Austria or 
Germany (Instituto Valenciano de Economía, Economía Citrícola, pp. 87-93; Abad, Historia de la 
Naranja, p. 275) 
47 Between 1870 and 1913, U.S.A. real wages were 3.8 times higher than those of Spain (O’Rourke and 
Williamson, Globalization, p. 17). The use of wage-earning labor in the cultivation process was much 
lower in Spain than in California, given that the small size of Spanish farms meant that in many cases 
they could be worked exclusively by family labor. Many wage-earning laborers were at the same time 
small proprietors, which meant that their sustenance did not depend exclusively on working as employees 
for third parties. In the preparation and packaging of oranges, a task that was much more mechanized in 
California than in Spain (although in this latter country many Californian innovations were introduced in 
the 1920s and 1930s), it was the Spanish practice to essentially employ women who were paid much 
lower salaries than men (Calatayud,”Condiciones”). The presence of children, with even lower wages, 
helping their mothers to package fruits and vegetables has also been occasionally noted (Borras, “Trabajo 
infantil”, p. 512). In the US it was considered that the high proportion of female and child labor was one 
of the reasons for the lower Spanish wage costs (Citrus Protective League,Circular). It is precisely these   22
yields obtained in Spain further strengthened its comparative advantages
48. For their 
part, Californian producers had the possibility of gaining access to a superior segment 
of the market, with a product whose differential qualities justified the price difference. 
However, taking into account that these types of products were still in their very initial 
phase of expansion amongst the majority of the population, it was very difficult for 
many of these to show any willingness to pay almost double the price for the “same” 
product. And it is here that we can understand the success of exports from Palestine in 
the 1930s, a time when Spanish exports were facing problems of both quantity, as a 
result of bad harvests, and quality, with the export of fruit blighted by frosts. The 
Palestinian Jaffa orange had a very similar price, was of a better quality thanks to 
superior ecological conditions, was commercialised under a single brand name and 
adopted Californian methods with greater success. 
TABLE 2. ORANGES. COST OF PRODUCTION PER BOX     
DELIVERED TO THE UNITED KINGDOM (around 1934) (in shillings)    
          
 South  Africa  California  Brazil  Spain  Palestine 
Cost of growing  2.50 2.75 1.33 1.00  2.00 
Handling   2.75 2.17 2.67 3.00  3.50 




c 2.92 3.67 3.50 1.08  1.17 
Other charges
a 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50  1.75 
Total 10.92 10.76 9.83 6.58  8.42 
Duty
d 0.00 2.50 2.50 1-2,5  1-2,5 
Grand total  10.92 13.26 12.33 7.58-9.08 
9.42-
10.92 
          
aOther overseas charges,including commission at 5%.      
bInland railage and other inland charges included in Handling      
cFreight includes insurance in California, Spain and Palestine.      
dOranges subjected to duty of 2.5 s. from 1st April to 30th December and to 10% ad valorem 
duty   
 from 1st December to 31st March.      
Source: Neumark, Citrus Industry, p. 113.      
 
The case of the US market was quite different, in that the advantage in transport 
costs enjoyed by the Europeans in their proximate markets either reduced or 
disappeared, whilst the higher incomes of the population and the greater maturity in the 
                                                                                                                                               
low wage costs that explain the limited incentives to mechanize the preparation of the fruit, a process 
which only began to make significant advances following the First World War when real wages began to 
rise significantly in Spain (Brown, Production, p. 17) 
48 Valencia also regarded its main strength to be the low wage and transport costs, together with the high 
productivity of the land (Instituto Valenciano de Economía, 1951)   23
diffusion of these products amongst consumers guaranteed a higher valuation of the 
“differential attributes” of the Californian fruit. Another option for California was to 
reduce labor costs to the maximum whenever possible through the use of intense 
mechanisation when the industrial transformation processes were relevant, as was the 
case with the raisin. Tariff barriers, although not yet decisive for some products, also 
helped to smooth the differential of production costs.  
Transport costs, therefore, played a key role in explaining the competitive 
positions of the producers in different markets. This should come as no surprise. An 
extensive literature devoted to this theme has demonstrated the high elasticities of trade 
volumes with respect to transport costs. The case we are considering here, that of fruits 
and vegetables, fits well with the situation of those products whose transport costs are 
very large relative to the value added attributable to immobile production factors
49. In 
this sense, the lines of specialization in Mediterranean horticultural production found in 
different countries would be determined by the interaction of two pairs of forces:  the 
product’s product transport intensity interacting with distance and the product’s factor 
intensity interacting with countries’ factor endowments
50.   
Furthermore, consideration should also be given to the existence of increasing 
returns in Mediterranean horticultural productions, above all with respect to the 
preparation of fruit and its commercialization. Both the Californian experience in the 
commercialization of citrus fruits by the large co-operatives, as well as the Spanish 
case, where some traders first bought the fruit on the tree and later prepared it for sale to 
the large British intermediaries who controlled the final stages of distribution, give 
support to the realism of this supposition. Here, we are dealing with a situation where 
spatial competition has an imperfect character and where there is a certain degree of 
monopolistic power over the most proximate consumers, with the transport costs being 
a source of market power.   
THE EXPORT OF MEDITERRANEAN HORTICULTURAL PRODUCTS 
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN SPAIN 
In this paper we have analysed the globalization process that affected 
Mediterranean horticulture. The most outstanding features of this process were the 
increase in the consumption of its products in the more industrialized countries, where 
                                                 
49 Henderson, Shalizi and Venables, “Geography”, pp. 87-88.   24
they became part of the diet, the extension of their cultivation to areas in whose 
agriculture they had not traditionally formed a part and a marked expansion in their 
international trade.  
Whilst globalization created opportunities, it also intensified competition and it 
can be supposed that at a certain point in time it came to represent a significant cost for 
the traditional producers. 
From our point of view, it is important to place emphasis on the fact that the 
development and growth of specialized horticulture of this type in Mediterranean 
countries such as Spain is a process that is contemporary to globalization itself. Thus, if 
in the second half of the nineteenth century the new opportunities that arose as a 
consequence of rising per capita income in the more developed countries led the 
Mediterranean countries to increase their production within the framework of a new 
pattern of agriculture that was specialized  and intensive in nature, the emergence in the 
first third of the twentieth century of important competitors such as California resulted 
in these Mediterranean countries, facing relevant costs. Having established that point, 
the rest of the paper has been dedicated to considering the case of Spain which, together 
with Italy, was one of the two powerhouses of Mediterranean horticulture in Europe, 
with our aim being to analyse and examine the impact of globalization on the traditional 
producers. 
In the middle of the nineteenth century specialized  Mediterranean horticulture 
had hardly begun to emerge in Spain, whilst its exports of these types of products were 
only incipient, except in some specific cases, such as raisins, in which certain areas had 
already been highly specialized  for a number of years. As we explained earlier, the rest 
of Mediterranean horticulture basically took the form either of the cultivation of fruit 
trees around the edges of fields dedicated to cereals under irrigation, or of small market 
gardens located close to population centres and used to produce some fresh fruits and 
vegetables. When these market gardens lay close to the largest cities, there may have 
been a certain commercial orientation towards supplying the local markets. However, 
the high cost and low speed of transport in inland Spain severely limited the distance 
over which such trade could be conducted.  
                                                                                                                                               
50 Venables and Limao, “Geographical”.   25
The increase in foreign demand, which took place as a result of increases in per 
capita income in countries such as the UK, together with the significant fall in maritime 
transport costs and the onset of the free trade movement, acted as a very significant 
impulse which could translate into attractive commercial opportunities
51. 
In order to carry out a more detailed analysis of Spanish participation in the 
international market for the period 1850-1935, we have carried out the following 
econometric analysis with the aim of specifying a demand-supply model. 
First, and with our objective being to specify the most appropriate model, we 
have checked for the order of integration of the time series that we consider might form 
part of the demand-supply model. The order of integration is tested for by two different 
methods: the augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test and the KPSS test
52. The former 
asserts that the variable is I(1) in the null hypothesis, while the latter formulates  the 
stationarity assumption as the null.
53 
Using the augmented Dickey-Fuller test, ADF, the null of non-stationarity is 
rejected in three out of seven variables, using the AIC criterion to select the number of 
lagged first differences in the test equation and at the 5 percent significance level. 
As the Dickey-Fuller test has been found to suffer from low power against 
stationary alternatives, we have also used the KPSS test, which has stationarity as the 
null and a unit root as the alternative hypothesis. The use of both tests allows for an 
empirically more satisfying sorting of time series into stationary ones, ones containing a 
unit root and ones not having sufficient information to distinguish between these two 
cases. 
The conclusions of the KPSS test, using the Andrews bandwidth and Parzen or 
Bartlett kernel, is that all the variables are stationary at a 5 percent significance level. 
Given the discrepancy with respect to the order of integration of some variables, 
depending upon the criterion employed, the demand and the supply of the exports have 
been estimated as a bi-equational and multivariate model from an error correction 
mechanism model, ECM. However, the lack of economic significance of the 
estimations is such that we have chosen not to take these results into account. Therefore, 
                                                 
51 On the fall in maritime transport costs, see Harley, “Transportation” and “Ocean freight rates”; 
Mohamedd and Williamson, “Freight rates”; North, “Ocean freight rates”.) 
52 Dickey and Fuller, “Likelihood ratio statistics”; Kwiatkowski et al, “Testing the null hypothesis”. 
53 This is the same methodology employed by  Strauss, “Multivariate cointegration analysis”.   26
and because all the variables are I(0) following the KPSS test, and because most of 
them are using the ADF test, we have estimated a bi-equational and multivariate model 
of export demand and supply which have been estimated simultaneously. 
The world demand for  Spanish exports is specified  in log-linear form as: 
t t t
D
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where: 
D X is the world demand for Spanish Mediterranean horticultural products, 
measured as their annual volume of exports. 
YW  is the arithmetic mean of the GDPs of the UK and France (Spain’s main 
customers for these types of products). 
PX  is the price of Spanish horticultural exports. 
PXW  is the Franco-UK consumer prices indexes as a proxy of the weighted 
average of the export prices of the UK and France
54. 
Since the equation is specified in logarithms, a1 and a2 are the relative price and 
real income elasticities of export demand, respectively. 
The supply of exports is specified as a log-linear function of the relative price of 
exports to domestic prices and of an index of the productive capacity with respect to 
Mediterranean horticultural products in Spain. Our main problem has been to find a 
series of this productive capacity, given that until 1929 no annual data was kept on 
surface area under cultivation or production for these types of products and neither was 
there any data on surface areas under irrigation in Spain. In an attempt to overcome this 
problem, we have tried to obtain series that give us an idea of the evolution of this 
productive capacity. To that end, we have estimated the evolution of surface area under 
irrigation, with truly precarious data, or the supply of water for irrigation. It should be 
noted, however, that for this purpose we have used only the capacity of reservoir-held 
water and without having any data on the water drawn from wells which, as we have 
already seen in this work, was fundamental for the expansion of Mediterranean 
                                                 
54 We have used the arithmetic mean of the French and UK GDP as a proxy variable of the weighted 
average of the GDPs of all Spain’s trading partners. Account has to be taken of the fact that between 1850   27
horticulture in Spain. Finally, we have also used the trend of agricultural production  
and the trend variable. This index of productive capacity has shown itself to be 
significant in only a few of the models estimated, which should come as no surprise 
given the poor quality of the data used to approximate to the variable that interests us. In 
those limited number of cases in which it was significant, the models were considerably 
worse, using the habitual selection criteria, than that finally chosen, as a result of which 
this variable has been eliminated from the final model.   
t t t
S
t u C P PX X 2 2 1 0 log ) / log( log + + + = β β β  
where: 
S X is the quantity of exports supplied. 
P is the domestic price index . 
C is an index of domestic Mediterranean horticultural productive capacity. 
The equation can be normalized for price of exports PXt, to yield: 
t 2 t 3 t 2
S
t 1 0 t u P log b C log b X log b b PX log + + + + =  
Following Morris Goldstein and Mohsin Khan we make the assumption that the 
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The estimator used was Full-Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) and the 
results of the selected model are the following: 
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and 1913 these two countries represented, according to the years, a minimum of 46.3 percent and a 
maximum of 68.1 percent of total Spanish exports (Prados de la Escosura, Comercio exterior, p. 48). 
55 Goldstein and Khan, “Supply and Demand”.   28
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where Ft is a Dummy variable with value 1 for  First World War and zero otherwise and 
FXt =FF*logXt where FF is another dummy variable which tries to capture the special 
economic circumstances that prevailed during the 1932-1935 depression. 
  The results (table 3) make clear the important role played in the rise in exports 
by the increase in per capita income of the world’s most developed countries (Spain’s 
main trading partners), with a income elasticity of 2.16 and significance at 1 percent 
level.  
In the previous section we have insisted on the point that the displacement of the 
demand curve is not sufficient to explain the agile response of supply. It is appropriate 
to recall that, quite apart from establishing a new system of specialized  agriculture, it 
was also necessary to overcome the main obstacle for this type of agriculture in Spain, 
namely the scarcity of water. This formidable producing effort made possible the 
response on the part of supply and was reflected in the increasing participation of 
Mediterranean horticulture in Spanish agricultural production as a whole and, in our 
view, could be explained by the high returns that were obtained as compared with those 
of traditional products. The elasticity of supply with respect to price makes clear the 
sensitivity of this to the opportunities that existed at the time. Its value is probably 
overestimated as a consequence of not being able to find a good series for the 
productive capacity of Mediterranean horticulture. In some of the models estimated –
finally rejected in function of the selection criteria- in which this variable was 
significant, the elasticity of supply with respect to price fell until reaching values of 
around 3.  
The behavior of the export prices of Mediterranean horticultural products 
provides us with a clear insight into this incentive for the growth in supply. Until the 
First World War, the weighted prices index of Spanish Mediterranean horticultural 
exports grew considerably more than the implicit deflactor of Spanish GDP, with the 
improvement in the prices of these exports with respect to this being almost 50 percent 
(Table 4). Although the First World War and its effects supposed a significant fall in   29
these prices, the subsequent recovery was important and their behavior during the 
depression era of the 1930s was outstanding. 
 
TABLE 3. SPANISH HORTICULTURAL EXPORTS 
DEMAND  
AND SUPPLY ELASTICITIES       
           
   Export-Demand  Export-Supply 
  
  
Price elasticity  -0.0593  7.8554** 
  
Income elasticity  2.1570**    
  
       
** means significance at 1percent level    
 
In this way, Spain became the main world exporter of these products. The 
evolution of its exports was truly impressive: in 1930-35 fruit exports were sixty times 
higher in volume than in 1850-59; that of nuts were almost seven times higher; whilst 
that of vegetables had multiplied by thirty. In their totality, the volumes exported had 
multiplied by eleven (Table 5). The more rapid growth in the exports of fresh fruits and 
vegetables meant that their weight within Mediterranean horticultural exports increased. 
In the case of fresh fruits, whilst this weight represented less than 15 percent of such 
exports in 1850, it had exceeded 60 percent by 1935 (Table 6).  
 
TABLE 4. REAL PRICES INDICES OF SPANISH EXPORTS OF   
MEDITERRANEAN HORTICULTURAL PRODUCTS, 1910=100 
  Nuts  Dried fruits  Fresh fruits  Vegetables  Total 
1850-59 50 103 93 81  81 
1860-69 77 103 163 110  104 
1870-79 67 114 117 76  100 
1880-89 74 107 135 121  111 
1890-99 96 111 143 121  122 
1900-09 112 136 125 104  121 
1910-19 99 99 99 99  99 
1920-29 109 121 113 129  115 
1930-35 104 142 149 136  137 
aThe prices of  mediterranean horticultural products have been deflated with Spanish Price Deflator for 
GDP, 
taken from Prados de la Escosura, El progreso. Source: Appendix. Tables I and J. 
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However, given the behaviour of Spanish export prices, the increase in value 
was much higher still, with the value of fruit exports rising by almost one hundred and 
seventy times, that of vegetables by ninety and that of nuts by almost twenty-five. When 
taken together, the value of these exports was more than thirty-free times higher than 
that of the mid-nineteenth century. 
 
TABLE 5. EVOLUTION OF SPANISH EXPORTS OF MEDITERRANEAN   
HORTICULTURAL PRODUCTS. VOLUME INDEX (1850-1859=100) (1910 
prices) 
  Nuts  Dried fruits  Fresh fruits  Vegetables  Total 
1850-59 100  100  100 100 100 
1860-69 111  125  167 118 124 
1870-79 152  212  371 203 208 
1880-89 150  197  808 341 256 
1890-99 242  193  1,481 951 390 
1900-09 338  165  2,895 1,910 613 
1910-19 410  130  3,235 2,876 699 
1920-29 530  110  4,610 3,230 907 
1930-35 689  79  6,285 3,068 1,137 
Source: Appendix. Table I.      
 
As a consequence of this dramatic expansion, the part represented by the exports 
of Mediterranean agricultural products in the total of Spanish exports of food, 
agricultural, livestock and forestry products (transformed and non-transformed) rose 
substantially, from less than 15 percent in 1850-59 to almost half in 1930-35. If we take 
into account that the exports of agricultural and food products at this latter date was 
76.6 percent of total Spanish exports, we can appreciate the point to which 
Mediterranean horticulture was key to the financing of the imports necessary for a 
country passing through the industrialization process, which was precisely the case of 
Spain during that epoch
56. 
In this context, it is difficult to think that the globalization of Mediterranean 
horticulture contributed to a supposed “prolonged crisis of Mediterranean agriculture”, 
or that increasing competition from California had the eventual effect of implying a 
progressive transfer of productive factors from the new agriculture of the Old World to 
that of the New. Rather, Mediterranean horticulture was over the long-term by far the 
most dynamic sector of Spanish agriculture, progressively concentrating an increasing 
                                                 
56  Pinilla, “Cambio agrario”, p. 155.   31
volume of productive factors and making an essential contribution to the Spain’s export 
trade. 
 
TABLE 6. BREAK DOWN OF SPANISH EXPORTS OF     
MEDITERRANEAN HORTICULTURAL PRODUCTS    
  Nuts  Dried fruits  Fresh fruits  Vegetables  Total 
% at 1910 prices         
1850-59 37.0 47.6 11.5 3.9 100 
1860-69 33.0 47.8 15.5 3.7 100 
1870-79 27.1 48.5 20.6 3.9 100 
1880-89 21.7 36.6 36.4 5.3 100 
1890-99 23.0 23.6 43.8 9.6 100 
1900-09 20.4 12.9 54.4 12.3 100 
1910-19 21.7 8.8 53.3 16.2 100 
1920-29 21.6 5.8 58.5 14.0 100 
1930-35 22.4 3.3 63.7 10.6 100 
% at current prices          
1850-59 22.6 59.6 13.8 3.9 100 
1860-69 24.9 46.5 24.7 3.9 100 
1870-79 18.0 54.9 24.1 3.0 100 
1880-89 14.4 35.4 44.4 5.8 100 
1890-99 18.2 21.1 51.4 9.4 100 
1900-09 18.8 14.6 55.9 10.7 100 
1910-19 23.0 9.2 51.5 16.2 100 
1920-29 20.5 5.9 58.2 15.5 100 
1930-35 16.6 3.5 69.4 10.6 100 
aThe composition of exports for each period has been calculated as an average of the annual 
composition 
for the corresponding years.       
Source: Appendix, tables I and J.      
 
Only in the case of dried fruit does this “pessimistic” vision of the impact of the 
globalization of European Mediterranean horticulture fit at all well. Here, both the long-
term fall in exports and the less than dynamic behavior of it supply are evident. 
However, we should note that even in its moment of greatest international vigour, 
namely the second half of the nineteenth century, the importance of this group of 
products in total Spanish exports was small, never reaching even 10 percent. Therefore, 
the damage caused to raisin producers and exporters alike, although locally significant 
given that its production was concentrated in two small areas (Malaga and Denia), was 
not serious either for the totality of Spanish exports or for its agricultural sector. 
Globalization, therefore, had a clearly positive effect for a producer such as 
Spain. This country took advantage of the increase in demand coming from the 
industrialized countries to expand its Mediterranean horticultural production, which was   32
by far the most dynamic sector of its agriculture until the outbreak of the Second World 
War. Its exports also increased very significantly, coming to represent an essential pillar 
of its foreign trade. 
The highest cost of globalization was the impossibility of growing in the US 
market. The limited presence in a market enjoying the most dynamic rate of growth in 
the world was undoubtedly a significant cost, as has already been suggested, not only 
from the point of view of the lost opportunities that lay there, but also given the impact 
that the increasing US production had on prices. José Morilla, Alan Olmstead and Paul 
Rhode  have argued that in 1910 the citrus revenue lost to the Mediterranean countries 
due to US production would have been sufficient to support about 312,000 people in 
these lands. When including other Mediterranean horticultural products, they estimate 
this figure to increase by around half a million more. Indeed, depending on the 
assumption with respect to the inelasticity of demand, this impact could have been even 
greater
57. 
We can try to be even more precise as regards the cost that US competition 
supposed for Spain. To that end, we have followed the same methodology employed by 
Morilla, Olmstead and Rhode to calculate the increase in revenue that would have taken 
place in Spain in the counterfactual case of the non-existence of US citrus fruit 
production. However, we have tried to make more precise the results that these authors 
offer for distinct market distributions between the different producers and a wide range 
of possible elasticities.  
The ratio of Spain “counterfactual” to “actual” revenues will be: 
1
)) /( ) 1 ( ( −
− + − δ σ σ θ  
where: 
   θ  is the non-US market share, that we have estimated from Appendix E and 
F
58 
   δ is the price elasticity of demand, from Table 3 
  σ is the price elasticity of supply, from Table 3 
                                                 
57 Morilla, Olmstead and Rhode, “Horn of Plenty”, pp. 343-345. 
58  Using North-American prices, the percentage represented by the US in the value of the world 
production of citrus fruits during the period 1909-13 was 21.4 percent. The use of other prices changes 
the final result only marginally: thus, using 1910 Spanish prices, we obtain the value 21.0 percent.    33
We find that the percentage increase in “counterfactual” to “actual” revenues for 
non-US producing countries would be 29.1 percent. With the assumed elasticities, this 
means that non-US producers would gain $1.14 for every dollar that US producers lost. 
This result is very close to the different estimations made by Morilla, Olmstead 
and Rhode. If the added net revenue for the traditional citrus producing countries would 
have been around $ 50.16 millions in 1910
59, and we estimate the Spanish share of it as 
30.3 percent (from Appendix, Tables E and F), then the “counterfactual” Spanish GDP 
would be some  0.8 percent higher that in the “actual” case
60. 
All this serves to emphasize the scale of the lost opportunities, bearing in mind 
that if, in addition to citrus fruits, we also add other products with similar situations, the 
effect would have been even greater. Furthermore, the increasing importance of US 
production up to the outbreak of the Second World War highlights the growing cost of 
this competition (Appendix, Tables E, F, G, and H ).  
CONCLUSIONS 
From the mid-nineteenth century onwards the nascent process of globalization of 
the world’s economies gave rise to important consequences which, during recent years, 
have come to be regarded as a priority area of research in economic history. In this 
paper, we have focussed on analyzing the process of globalization and its consequences 
in the production and trade of Mediterranean horticultural products. 
We have first placed emphasis on how the countries lying on the northern shore 
of the Mediterranean took advantage of the sharp increase in demand for these types of 
products coming from the more industrialized countries, above all from the United 
Kingdom, to increase their production and exports. By the closing years of the 
nineteenth century, these producer countries had consolidated solid positions in the 
international markets for these products. However, these were to come under threat 
from the process of globalization of production which followed that of consumption. It 
was, above all, Californian agriculture which, with its modern technology and 
innovative marketing, supposed the greatest threat for the European producers. Whilst 
                                                 
59  Morilla, Olmstead and Rhode, “Horn of Plenty”, p. 345, estimate that the added net revenue for the 
traditional citrus sector would equal roughly $44 million per year. This calculation has been made on the 
basis of a gain for the non-US producers of $1 for each $1 lost by the US producers.  
60  Agricultural production would have been 2.7 percent higher  and with the per capita income of this 
year it would have been possible to maintain 149,768 more people. GDP data of Prados de la Escosura, 
Progreso.   34
these producers lost large sections of the North American market, in part as a 
consequence of the protectionist trade barriers raised there, they nevertheless 
maintained their solid positions in their remaining markets, in such a way that 
Mediterranean horticulture continued to be a source of agricultural progress and growth 
for these countries. 
We have tried to analyze the lines of specialization developed by the two most 
important producers, California and Spain. In order to explain them it is necessary, from 
our point of view, to draw both on the theory of international trade and on the 
arguments that the new economic geography provides in order to better understand the 
competitive possibilities of different countries. In this way, we find that the 
specialization responded well to the Heckser-Ohlin approach, with California taking 
advantage of the relatively low cost of capital to compensate for its high wage costs and 
Spain, by contrast, using the labor factor more intensively, taking full advantage in this 
case of its low relative cost and the high cost of capital. However, the technological 
leadership enjoyed by California could not triumph over Spanish production in the 
European markets, where Spain also benefited to a great extent from its geographical 
location which allowed it to support much lower transport costs.  
We have used the Spanish situation to carry out a case study  that sheds light on 
the effects of the globalization process. In this way, we have seen how globalization in 
the second half of the nineteenth century led to the development in Spain of a new and 
dynamic agriculture specializing in Mediterranean horticultural products. Competition 
from California did not detain this expansion, which continued throughout the first third 
of the twentieth century, in such a way that between 1850 and 1936 the exports of these 
products underwent a truly spectacular growth. In an attempt to explain this, we have 
estimated a bi-equational demand-supply model and a multivariate model in which the 
prices and quantities have been determined jointly for Spanish exports of Mediterranean 
horticultural products during the period 1850-1935. Their results make clear the 
importance that both the increase in income of the populations of the more developed 
countries and the changes in the prices of these products had for the growth of these 
exports. The behavior of these prices, in turn, highlights that their positive evolution 
was crucial for the expansion of supply. 
Finally, and having appreciated that Mediterranean horticulture was the most 
dynamic sector of Spanish agriculture, we have tried to measure the impact of   35
Californian competition. To that end, we have analyzed the counter-factual situation of 
the non-existence of this competition for the case of citrus fruits, with the results 
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 APPENDIX. TABLE A. WORLD TRADE IN ORANGES (1909-1938)
1909-1913 1925-1928 1929-1932 1933-1935 1936-1938 1909-1913 1925-1928 1929-1932 1933-1935 1936-1938
Exports Thousands of quintals %
   Spain 5.079 7.277 9.034 8.543 n.a. 65,6 59,3 61,0 48,9 n.a.
   Italy 1.201 1.289 1.019 1.086 1.279 15,5 10,5 6,9 6,2 7,3
Europe 6.313 8.987 10.533 9.926 6.216 79,2 73,3 71,2 56,8 35,3
   United States 380 965 1.391 1.289 1.565 4,9 7,9 9,4 7,4 8,9
N&C America 666 1.012 1.598 2.076 2.457 8,4 8,2 10,8 11,9 14,0
   Brazil 1 120 314 1.019 1.778 0,0 1,0 2,1 5,8 10,1
South America 256 474 421 1.315 2.064 3,2 3,9 2,8 7,5 11,7
   Japan 147 258 258 511 660 1,9 2,1 1,7 2,9 3,7
   Palestine 438 754 945 1.822 2.878 5,7 6,1 6,4 10,4 16,3
Asia 607 1.270 1.459 2.894 4.734 7,6 10,4 9,9 16,6 26,9
   Algeria 126 224 129 271 576 1,6 1,8 0,9 1,6 3,3
   South Africa 5 232 494 662 959 0,1 1,9 3,3 3,8 5,4
Africa 131 492 748 1.151 1.997 1,6 4,0 5,1 6,6 11,3
Aust. & Oceania 0 34 41 108 142 0,0 0,3 0,3 0,6 0,8
World exports 7.974 12.269 14.798 17.470 17.611 100 100 100 100 100
Imports Thousands of quintals %
   Germany 1.307 2.172 2.764 2.583 1.493 18,1 19,3 19,1 14,8 8,8
   Belgium 242 311 636 751 839 3,3 2,8 4,4 4,3 4,9
   France 988 1.150 1.816 2.998 2.330 13,6 10,2 12,6 17,2 13,7
   U.K. 2.876 3.985 4.981 5.464 5.556 39,7 35,4 34,5 31,3 32,6
   Netherlands 221 631 810 636 738 3,0 5,6 5,6 3,6 4,3
Europa 6.937 9.805 13.113 15.013 14.033 95,8 87,1 90,7 86,0 82,3
   Canada n.a. 609 723 778 980 n.a. 5,4 5,0 4,5 5,7
N&C America 138 960 770 1.085 1.361 1,9 8,5 5,3 6,2 8,0
S. America 12 21 2 498 433 0,2 0,2 0,0 2,9 2,5
Asia 39 288 320 656 914 0,5 2,6 2,2 3,8 5,4
Africa 98 141 92 74 49 1,4 1,2 0,6 0,4 0,3
Aust. & Oceania 16 41 107 133 193 0,2 0,4 0,7 0,8 1,1
World imports 7.240 11.256 14.455 17.466 17.058 100 100 100 100 100
aPalestine exports in 1925-28 includes lemons; Japan exportsalways includes  lemons; Belgium  
imports always includes lemons; USA imports from Hawai are not included.
Source: International Institute of Agriculture, Annuaire  and Mitchell, International Historical Statistics .m
APPENDIX. TABLE B. WORLD TRADE IN LEMONS (1909-1938)
1909-1913 1925-1928 1929-1932 1933-1935 1936-1938 1909-1913 1925-1928 1929-1932 1933-1935 1936-1938
Exports Thousands of quintals %
   Spain 33 147 182 273 n.a. 1,2 5,5 6,2 9,1 n.a.
   Italy 2.670 2.353 2.510 2.455 1.990 97,6 88,2 86,1 81,8 76,1
Europe 2.703 2.502 2.728 2.752 2.194 98,8 93,9 93,6 91,7 83,9
   United States 21 85 80 105 188 0,8 3,2 2,7 3,5 7,2
N&C America 21 85 90 145 254 0,8 3,2 3,1 4,8 9,7
S. America 124386 0 , 4 0 , 2 0 , 1 0 , 3 0 , 2
Asia n.a. 71 86 83 135 n.a. 2,6 3,0 2,8 5,2
Africa n.a. 4 7 11 23 n.a. 0,1 0,2 0,4 0,9
Aust. & Oceania n.a. 0023 n.a. 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,1
World 2.736 2.666 2.914 3.001 2.615 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Imports Thousands of quintals %
   Germany 375 550 701 702 645 18,3 23,5 26,1 24,2 25,5
   France 90 275 378 302 280 4,4 11,7 14,0 10,4 11,1
   United Kingdo 437 633 724 794 543 21,4 27,1 26,9 27,4 21,5
Europe 1.416 1.837 2.286 2.634 2.249 69,2 78,5 85,0 90,8 89,1
   Canada n.a. 92 125 128 132 n.a. 3,9 4,7 4,4 5,2
   United States 624 366 173 41 59 30,5 15,7 6,4 1,4 2,3
N&C America 624 459 301 174 196 30,5 19,6 11,2 6,0 7,8
S. America 0 0 27 17 17 0,0 0,0 1,0 0,6 0,7
Asia 2 7 47 45 33 0,1 0,3 1,8 1,6 1,3
Africa n.a. 30 23 22 19 n.a. 1,3 0,8 0,8 0,7
Aust. & Oceania 3668 1 1 0 , 2 0 , 3 0 , 2 0 , 3 0 , 4
World 2.044 2.339 2.690 2.900 2.525 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Source: International Institute of Agriculture, Annuaire.APPENDIX. TABLE C. WORLD TRADE IN TABLE GRAPES (1903-1938)
1903-1908 1909-1913 1914-1920 1921-1924 1925-1928 1929-1932 1933-1935 1936-1938 1903-1908 1909-1913 1914-1920 1921-1924 1925-1928 1929-1932 1933-1935 1
Exports Thousands of quintals %
   Spain 429 444 323 391 373 493 483 n.a. 34,4 33,0 63,1 48,2 25,8 25,7 25,9
   France 251 229 16 104 305 255 59 89 20,1 17,1 3,2 12,8 21,0 13,3 3,2
   Italy 275 291 56 168 277 386 279 261 22,0 21,7 10,9 20,7 19,1 20,1 15,0
Europe 1.179 1.183 457 705 1.194 1.586 1.442 1.295 94,6 88,0 89,2 86,8 82,5 82,7 77,4
   USA 0 0 1 66 167 175 157 303 0,0 0,0 0,2 8,2 11,5 9,1 8,5
N&C America 0 0 1 66 167 176 158 303 0,0 0,0 0,2 8,2 11,6 9,1 8,5
S. America 0002 1 7 5 1 6 9 9 8 0 , 0 0 , 0 0 , 0 0 , 3 1 , 2 2 , 7 3 , 7
Asia 0553 1 3 2 1 2 4 4 0 0 , 0 0 , 4 0 , 9 0 , 4 0 , 9 1 , 1 1 , 3
   Algeria 67 156 50 36 57 79 97 84 5,4 11,6 9,7 4,4 3,9 4,1 5,2
Africa 68 156 50 36 57 79 170 192 5,4 11,6 9,7 4,4 3,9 4,1 9,1
Aust.& Oceania 0000003 1 5 0 , 0 0 , 0 0 , 0 0 , 0 0 , 0 0 , 0 0 , 1
World 1.247 1.345 512 813 1.447 1.918 1.862 1.943 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Imports Thousands of quintals %
   Germany 438 348 n.a. 137 538 678 599 681 38,3 29,1 n.a. 14,7 35,4 34,8 32,3
   France 66 88 60 47 78 161 141 101 5,8 7,4 10,6 5,1 5,1 8,3 7,6
   UK 373 311 275 355 387 433 468 391 32,6 26,0 48,9 38,0 25,4 22,2 25,2
Europe 1.052 905 387 715 1.218 1.674 1.555 1.521 92,0 75,5 68,9 76,5 80,2 85,8 83,8
   Canada 10 25 31 43 97 107 83 131 0,9 2,1 5,6 4,5 6,4 5,5 4,5
   USA n.a. 166 100 86 13 24 44 42 n.a. 13,9 17,8 9,2 0,8 1,2 2,4
N&C America 13 197 136 136 134 147 142 196 1,2 16,4 24,2 14,5 8,8 7,5 7,7
S. America 0 18 12 11 60 24 34 35 0,0 1,5 2,2 1,2 3,9 1,2 1,8
Asia 011104 2 9 4 5 0 , 0 0 , 1 0 , 1 0 , 1 0 , 0 0 , 2 1 , 5
Africa 78 78 26 71 107 100 90 62 6,8 6,5 4,6 7,6 7,0 5,1 4,9
Aust. & Oceania 01012368 0 , 0 0 , 1 0 , 0 0 , 1 0 , 1 0 , 2 0 , 3
World 1.143 1.199 562 935 1.520 1.952 1.857 1.868 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0

























100,0APPENDIX. TABLE D. WORLD TRADE IN RAISINS (1903-1938)
1903-1908 1909-1913 1914-1920 1921-1924 1925-1928 1929-1932 1933-1935 1936-1938 1903-1908 1909-1913 1914-1920 1921-1924 1925-1928 1929-1932 1933-1935 1936-1938
Exports Thousands of quintals %
   Spain 270 240 172 152 177 142 110 n.a. 18,9 9,8 10,8 6,9 6,4 5,2 3,8 n.a.
   Greece 1.077 1.063 803 1.038 949 845 954 1.061 75,5 43,3 50,7 46,9 34,3 30,9 32,8 32,5
Europe 1.385 1.548 1.012 1.322 1.173 1.018 1.089 1.189 97,1 63,0 63,8 59,8 42,4 37,2 37,4 36,4
   USA 32 85 263 340 766 600 448 600 2,2 3,5 16,6 15,4 27,7 22,0 15,4 18,4
N&C America 32 85 263 340 767 600 448 600 2,2 3,5 16,6 15,4 27,7 22,0 15,4 18,4
S. America 11232359 0 , 1 0 , 0 0 , 1 0 , 2 0 , 1 0 , 1 0 , 2 0 , 3
   Turkey n.a. 489 n.a. 330 351 417 588 593 n.a. 19,9 n.a. 14,9 12,7 15,3 20,2 18,2
   Persia n.a. 299 245 88 216 196 108 n.a. n.a. 12,2 15,4 4,0 7,8 7,2 3,7 n.a.
Asia n.a. 819 271 436 605 686 730 761 n.a. 33,3 17,1 19,7 21,9 25,1 25,1 23,3
Africa 0 0 9 35 22 20 41 64 0,0 0,0 0,6 1,6 0,8 0,7 1,4 2,0
   Australia 7 5 27 74 198 352 566 602 0,5 0,2 1,7 3,4 7,2 12,9 19,4 18,4
Aust.& Oceania 8 5 27 75 198 353 566 602 0,5 0,2 1,7 3,4 7,2 12,9 19,4 18,4
World 1.426 2.459 1.585 2.212 2.767 2.732 2.911 3.264 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Imports Thousands of quintals %
   Germany 386 346 n.a. 137 385 442 576 718 15,1 13,3 n.a. 6,4 14,3 15,6 19,7 22,8
   UK 962 1.000 890 1.164 1.264 1.270 1.288 1.295 37,5 38,5 56,4 54,1 46,8 44,9 44,1 41,2
Europe 2.175 2.184 1.216 1.687 2.202 2.353 2.534 2.705 84,7 84,2 77,1 78,4 81,6 83,2 86,7 85,9
   Canada 110 154 160 187 205 197 172 191 4,3 5,9 10,1 8,7 7,6 7,0 5,9 6,1
   USA 193 179 133 190 77 44 34 25 7,5 6,9 8,5 8,8 2,9 1,6 1,2 0,8
N&C America 308 336 296 378 289 249 216 229 12,0 12,9 18,8 17,6 10,7 8,8 7,4 7,3
S. America 6 11 7 9 14 17 15 12 0,2 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,5 0,4
Asia 0 4 11 13 14 19 40 37 0,0 0,1 0,7 0,6 0,5 0,7 1,4 1,2
Africa 6 15 12 27 34 37 29 26 0,2 0,6 0,8 1,2 1,2 1,3 1,0 0,8
Aust. & Oceania 72 44 36 36 49 52 50 57 2,8 1,7 2,3 1,7 1,8 1,8 1,7 1,8
World total 2.566 2.594 1.579 2.151 2.697 2.828 2.922 3.148 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Source: International Institute of Agriculture, Annuaire.APPENDIX. TABLE E. ORANGES AND MANDARINS, WORLD PRODUCTION
Thousands of quintals %
1909-13 1925-28 1929-32 1933-35 1909-13 1925-28 1929-32 1933-35
   Spain 8.395 11.177 12.517 9.161 29,2 32,3 24,1 16,8
   Italy 3.796 2.632 3.396 3.408 13,2 7,6 6,5 6,3
Europe n.a. 13.965 16.044 12.779 n.a. 40,3 30,8 23,5
   Brazil 1 115 10.365 11.415 0,0 0,3 19,9 21,0
   United States 6.500 12.393 15.967 19.008 22,6 35,8 30,7 34,9
America 8.061 14.356 28.199 31.984 28,0 41,4 54,2 58,8
   Japan 2.004 3.158 3.304 4.142 7,0 9,1 6,4 7,6
   Palestine n.a. 787 1.060 1.873 n.a. 2,3 2,0 3,4
Asia n.a. 4.483 5.552 6.457 n.a. 12,9 10,7 11,9
   Algeria n.a. 780 549 725 n.a. 2,3 1,1 1,3
   South Africa n.a. 251 729 953 n.a. 0,7 1,4 1,8
Africa n.a. 1.182 1.442 2.337 n.a. 3,4 2,8 4,3
Australia&Oceania n.a. 663 780 870 n.a. 1,9 1,5 1,6
WORLD 28.756 34.648 52.017 54.428 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
aPalestinian production is exports. Production from South Africa and Brazil until 1933 are exports.
Soviet Union and China productions are not included.
Source: International Institute of Agriculture, Annuaire. Spanish production (1903-13) from Grupo de Estudios
de Historia Rural, Estadísticas Históricas  , p. 1195. 
APPENDIX. TABLE F. LEMONS, WORLD PRODUCTION, 1909-1938
1909-13 1924-28 1928-32 1933-35 1936-38 1909-13 1924-28 1928-32 1933-35 1936-38
Thousands of quintals %
   Spain 350 507 556 550 n.a. 6,6 7,0 6,3 6,0 n.a.
   Italy 3.756 3.922 4.704 3.861 2.915 70,9 54,1 53,5 42,1 36,6
Europe 4.107 4.488 5.328 4.532 3.053 77,5 61,9 60,6 49,4 38,3
   United States 925 2.292 2.503 2.968 3.009 17,5 31,6 28,5 32,3 37,8
America 1.194 2.567 3.022 3.253 3.305 22,5 35,4 34,4 35,4 41,5
Asia n.a. 4 241 245 264 n.a. 0,1 2,7 2,7 3,3
   Egypt n.a. n.a. n.a. 955 1.199 n.a. n.a. n.a. 10,4 15,1
Africa n.a. 78 77 1.011 1.236 n.a. 1,1 0,9 11,0 15,5
Oceania n.a. 113 117 141 109 n.a. 1,6 1,3 1,5 1,4
World Total 5.300 7.250 8.785 9.182 7.966 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Source: International Institute of Agriculture, Annuaire.APPENDIX. TABLE G. TABLE GRAPES, WORLD
PRODUCTION, 1929-1932
               Thousands of quintals %
   Spain 1.745 10,4
   France 1.204 7,2
   Greece 471 2,8
   Hungary 333 2,0
   Italy 1.988 11,9
Europe 6.483 38,7
   USA 5.207 31,1
America 5.675 33,8
   Cyprus 416 2,5
   Japan 545 3,2
   Syria/Lebanon 1.336 8,0
   Turkey 1.106 6,6
Asia 3.551 21,2




Source: International Institute of Agriculture, Annuaire.
APPENDIX. TABLE H. RAISINS, WORLD 
PRODUCTION, 1929-1932
                        Thousands of quintals %
   Spain 673 9,2
   Greece 1.500 20,5
Europe 2.215 30,3
   USA 1.901 26,0
America 1.901 26,0
   Persia 408 5,6




World Total 7.307 100,0
Source: International Institute of Agriculture, Annuaire.APPENDIX. TABLE I. SPANISH EXPORTS OF MEDITERRANEAN 
HORTICULTURAL PRODUCTS. VOLUME INDEX (1910 prices in pesetas), 1850-1935
Nuts Dried fruits Fresh fruits Vegetables Total Index
1850 7.298.789 8.796.401 1.822.161 679.062 18.596.413 11
1851 6.690.712 12.604.075 2.491.584 815.293 22.601.664 14
1852 8.746.244 8.488.578 1.737.067 486.734 19.458.623 12
1853 4.742.195 9.810.963 2.278.346 833.659 17.665.164 11
1854 7.914.307 8.909.734 1.975.965 696.168 19.496.175 12
1855 7.096.525 7.925.318 2.408.809 892.770 18.323.423 11
1856 8.879.458 9.285.690 3.524.323 826.935 22.516.406 14
1857 7.252.522 9.457.548 2.292.285 1.077.411 20.079.766 12
1858 9.152.370 12.713.341 2.770.316 1.158.824 25.794.851 16
1859 10.491.699 12.734.789 3.080.306 883.048 27.189.842 17
1860 5.288.563 13.806.656 4.886.981 861.274 24.843.475 15
1861 7.638.222 9.932.190 3.061.625 2.003.873 22.635.909 14
1862 7.008.336 11.075.195 4.867.072 2.186.291 25.136.894 15
1863 7.226.501 11.839.565 3.819.417 593.739 23.479.223 14
1864 7.564.512 10.855.435 3.456.682 676.656 22.553.285 14
1865 8.821.875 14.312.770 3.002.241 779.774 26.916.661 16
1866 9.282.352 14.093.010 3.229.345 559.504 27.164.212 17
1867 10.334.377 13.059.642 4.534.415 557.452 28.485.886 17
1868 12.969.488 14.884.324 4.625.666 742.804 33.222.282 20
1869 10.766.108 11.986.776 5.256.354 889.390 28.898.628 18
1870 8.494.562 20.248.325 5.037.102 1.119.173 34.899.162 21
1871 13.584.460 18.484.561 7.593.925 2.028.467 41.691.414 25
1872 13.055.744 25.369.145 8.129.640 1.475.958 48.030.487 29
1873 16.461.358 19.641.642 8.457.941 1.453.489 46.014.430 28
1874 8.592.055 22.176.057 8.676.131 1.603.527 41.047.770 25
1875 12.788.398 18.375.553 6.456.015 1.806.810 39.426.777 24
1876 9.810.399 24.131.373 8.965.766 1.920.095 44.827.633 27
1877 13.021.583 21.421.782 10.930.414 2.030.123 47.403.902 29
1878 9.246.137 24.343.712 13.234.006 1.802.143 48.625.999 30
1879 13.914.597 18.890.696 13.066.127 1.749.425 47.620.845 29
1880 12.964.448 17.853.851 15.036.497 2.660.016 48.514.813 30
1881 11.502.446 21.504.775 13.048.613 2.205.781 48.261.616 29
1882 12.956.429 24.192.695 23.893.960 2.184.522 63.227.607 39
1883 11.370.536 20.580.659 20.795.143 2.488.987 55.235.325 34
1884 9.926.169 16.947.861 19.907.661 2.217.550 48.999.241 30
1885 10.939.960 18.769.381 16.011.270 2.616.183 48.336.793 29
1886 7.997.411 21.773.267 20.657.837 3.089.475 53.517.990 33
1887 13.683.380 22.817.876 21.145.442 3.051.904 60.698.602 37
1888 12.515.904 17.643.250 23.201.090 3.466.658 56.826.902 35
1889 13.928.024 16.293.244 23.233.114 4.490.374 57.944.756 35
1890 10.405.092 29.011.441 27.733.524 5.266.033 72.416.090 44
1891 17.583.662 16.739.514 20.724.099 5.511.952 60.559.227 37
1892 16.618.637 21.457.746 21.956.998 4.657.710 64.691.091 39
1893 18.223.454 15.807.293 26.918.998 8.189.013 69.138.757 42
1894 15.448.765 18.831.588 33.463.468 7.714.382 75.458.204 46
1895 19.105.316 16.489.991 42.529.945 8.459.139 86.584.391 53
1896 20.876.991 17.299.744 39.422.278 9.462.441 87.061.455 53
1897 24.378.589 18.207.045 47.564.876 8.631.683 98.782.194 60
1898 23.668.702 20.300.599 44.320.053 9.702.692 97.992.046 60
1899 23.057.990 20.726.734 56.522.359 11.783.611 112.090.694 68
1900 14.996.389 21.030.252 51.145.439 11.557.728 98.729.808 60
1901 19.263.513 18.403.672 55.346.402 13.260.172 106.273.759 65
1902 24.553.705 16.805.709 66.260.968 12.698.686 120.319.068 73
1903 30.283.637 17.959.466 75.929.973 16.243.823 140.416.899 861904 34.042.293 15.503.117 76.100.705 17.494.143 143.140.258 87
1905 26.952.314 17.210.674 62.594.543 15.473.395 122.230.926 75
1906 24.217.256 12.058.641 70.143.676 15.663.658 122.083.230 74
1907 28.381.133 15.656.446 88.477.440 19.381.105 151.896.124 93
1908 25.553.792 15.172.416 79.022.328 18.623.162 138.371.699 84
1909 36.585.485 16.861.730 80.895.854 19.049.614 153.392.682 94
1910 32.029.263 16.243.433 92.442.763 23.282.938 163.998.397 100
1911 36.821.168 17.107.381 83.646.594 26.376.887 163.952.029 100
1912 29.647.217 10.742.235 100.484.254 25.573.183 166.446.889 101
1913 35.434.336 11.923.156 102.492.785 26.081.625 175.931.902 107
1914 21.968.258 9.006.843 84.562.658 23.536.974 139.074.733 85
1915 31.433.364 9.977.879 73.668.353 23.911.338 138.990.935 85
1916 24.551.481 12.908.681 84.256.157 25.656.612 147.372.931 90
1917 23.094.549 9.536.514 49.978.223 26.252.995 108.862.281 66
1918 34.362.671 13.180.455 45.931.413 17.636.972 111.111.511 68
1919 51.522.065 19.840.782 71.226.699 21.792.592 164.382.137 100
1920 30.173.480 17.967.760 61.243.874 23.729.189 133.114.303 81
1921 32.881.292 12.254.486 79.837.214 25.474.266 150.447.258 92
1922 31.844.478 10.311.849 83.633.316 21.031.095 146.820.737 90
1923 38.092.442 8.054.757 91.419.872 24.688.076 162.255.147 99
1924 50.510.856 11.139.697 123.113.792 29.767.104 214.531.449 131
1925 40.192.854 11.008.571 126.848.735 28.726.371 206.776.530 126
1926 39.251.308 11.613.342 127.151.276 29.126.361 207.142.287 126
1927 44.994.503 11.177.178 116.289.182 26.972.380 199.433.244 122
1928 51.827.012 8.715.827 158.339.978 29.226.802 248.109.620 151
1929 55.262.575 9.031.342 156.043.303 30.990.171 251.327.392 153
1930 42.508.991 9.355.986 190.003.153 30.051.608 271.919.739 166
1931 53.639.127 9.262.146 144.931.388 23.851.848 231.684.509 141
1932 45.730.004 8.648.869 154.577.477 28.595.258 237.551.608 145
1933 48.742.639 6.141.999 157.299.198 24.377.702 236.561.539 144
1934 60.427.585 7.210.499 153.124.795 25.225.251 245.988.130 150
1935 72.535.572 6.990.307 119.413.686 21.585.672 220.525.237 134
Source: Estadística del Comercio Exterior de España.APPENDIX. TABLE J. SPANISH EXPORTS OF MEDITERRANEAN 
HORTICULTURAL PRODUCTS  (current prices in pesetas), 1850-1935
Nuts Dried fruits Fresh fruits Vegetables Total
1.850 4.090.538 8.315.284 1.633.994 654.833 14.694.650
1.851 2.670.413 10.089.346 2.175.306 656.838 15.591.904
1.852 4.050.947 5.590.544 1.195.343 355.999 11.192.834
1.853 2.555.771 11.139.389 1.753.103 855.067 16.303.330
1.854 2.305.167 5.760.668 954.024 345.199 9.365.059
1.855 4.661.915 10.743.995 2.340.698 750.975 18.497.584
1.856 7.736.139 18.322.365 6.842.240 1.055.739 33.956.482
1.857 5.753.752 17.711.821 3.742.438 1.222.682 28.430.694
1.858 5.415.028 16.853.567 3.383.945 1.022.893 26.675.434
1.859 7.801.902 19.374.905 4.702.854 1.155.427 33.035.087
1.860 3.940.658 21.570.824 6.437.445 959.741 32.908.668
1.861 7.088.537 15.026.916 4.992.595 2.290.726 29.398.774
1.862 6.429.961 15.472.121 10.942.809 2.925.204 35.770.094
1.863 7.681.650 17.891.629 8.294.406 770.722 34.638.408
1.864 6.599.700 15.731.931 6.555.483 908.943 29.796.057
1.865 6.306.152 12.858.203 5.270.856 1.066.729 25.501.940
1.866 8.468.007 11.922.219 6.021.854 672.409 27.084.488
1.867 12.233.856 15.005.913 12.669.268 879.657 40.788.694
1.868 14.416.995 17.322.231 10.368.328 1.132.051 43.239.605
1.869 13.116.446 18.541.006 14.202.742 1.755.191 47.615.386
1.870 6.031.285 23.138.614 4.877.836 792.695 34.840.429
1.871 12.033.568 24.830.589 9.765.803 1.752.097 48.382.056
1.872 9.776.680 35.562.559 10.504.154 1.164.397 57.007.789
1.873 12.303.780 24.853.806 10.995.870 1.257.873 49.411.329
1.874 7.076.752 30.798.678 13.481.692 1.526.084 52.883.206
1.875 10.945.334 27.842.654 11.114.443 1.758.330 51.660.760
1.876 6.855.997 31.184.867 12.994.739 1.571.231 52.606.834
1.877 10.184.295 30.069.684 16.578.739 1.902.965 58.735.683
1.878 7.480.372 32.167.097 17.543.755 1.879.148 59.070.373
1.879 10.429.135 23.054.978 16.896.104 1.745.664 52.125.880
1.880 10.439.899 24.085.919 20.652.980 2.686.470 57.865.268
1.881 9.442.045 28.861.855 17.129.476 2.268.481 57.701.857
1.882 9.455.993 28.662.562 37.252.535 1.989.575 77.360.665
1.883 10.759.339 25.982.485 36.149.485 3.655.889 76.547.198
1.884 8.475.020 19.769.198 35.478.092 3.626.557 67.348.866
1.885 8.940.621 22.469.272 23.849.429 3.940.470 59.199.792
1.886 6.787.557 26.878.803 31.715.843 4.792.261 70.174.464
1.887 10.724.292 24.171.084 29.782.014 4.539.681 69.217.071
1.888 10.261.725 19.034.045 33.829.653 5.129.678 68.255.100
1.889 11.351.408 17.268.918 30.998.586 5.955.921 65.574.834
1.890 8.717.990 27.625.115 34.095.113 6.136.795 76.575.012
1.891 16.106.062 15.926.154 26.758.356 6.601.732 65.392.303
1.892 19.132.630 25.968.278 36.616.550 6.727.315 88.444.773
1.893 20.395.176 22.101.847 37.610.091 11.717.660 91.824.774
1.894 17.130.623 27.694.402 57.467.118 11.668.950 113.961.093
1.895 18.539.812 18.838.874 67.890.305 10.332.704 115.601.696
1.896 19.806.099 19.220.579 66.978.838 11.251.448 117.256.965
1.897 23.635.115 20.924.584 90.919.631 10.731.661 146.210.990
1.898 28.936.471 26.610.004 56.573.353 13.614.879 125.734.706
1.899 25.047.379 23.847.521 82.914.204 12.795.005 144.604.109
1.900 20.922.760 36.122.090 86.189.176 14.542.848 157.776.8731.901 27.726.198 31.616.172 93.705.329 16.773.145 169.820.844
1.902 32.895.053 26.236.673 103.440.211 14.659.420 177.231.357
1.903 38.200.335 28.492.688 110.600.245 17.632.141 194.925.409
1.904 44.616.874 25.544.591 115.750.509 19.740.717 205.652.691
1.905 36.781.001 29.620.393 101.423.618 18.427.252 186.252.264
1.906 34.504.021 21.449.273 106.807.083 22.141.206 184.901.583
1.907 41.526.860 28.815.260 134.408.777 27.188.087 231.938.984
1.908 30.824.638 22.998.054 92.755.673 26.340.010 172.918.375
1.909 40.842.366 18.823.667 90.308.442 21.168.749 171.143.223
1.910 37.372.934 18.953.441 107.865.651 27.167.397 191.359.424
1.911 46.677.593 21.686.748 106.037.422 33.437.802 207.839.565
1.912 39.045.852 14.147.692 132.339.345 33.734.189 219.267.078
1.913 46.034.983 15.490.125 133.162.657 33.943.501 228.631.267
1.914 21.973.247 9.008.888 84.581.869 23.582.077 139.146.081
1.915 37.698.047 11.966.476 88.350.490 28.720.266 166.735.279
1.916 26.991.301 14.191.492 92.629.509 28.278.245 162.090.547
1.917 43.968.101 18.155.808 95.149.901 49.969.347 207.243.157
1.918 78.281.504 30.026.357 104.585.653 40.173.058 253.066.572
1.919 115.135.522 44.337.875 159.169.156 48.700.921 367.343.475
1.920 50.475.505 30.117.137 102.655.546 38.493.609 221.741.796
1.921 73.667.598 43.830.914 199.105.995 89.333.208 405.937.715
1.922 56.270.356 29.826.550 190.213.245 64.284.363 340.594.515
1.923 87.085.515 25.453.689 208.091.431 75.938.132 396.568.767
1.924 128.345.954 37.475.750 304.042.268 100.146.193 570.010.165
1.925 125.160.490 26.302.013 382.393.894 86.594.719 620.451.115
1.926 117.645.778 27.021.437 383.419.050 88.455.643 616.541.908
1.927 111.140.144 22.030.352 269.491.586 58.849.203 461.511.285
1.928 127.823.150 18.038.600 384.770.824 69.149.091 599.781.665
1.929 124.311.254 26.253.568 417.011.133 83.482.644 651.058.598
1.930 111.168.826 32.848.637 636.669.087 100.197.457 880.884.008
1.931 155.524.970 37.103.850 594.398.935 87.224.404 874.252.159
1.932 100.292.960 22.587.215 513.186.536 79.562.286 715.628.997
1.933 92.912.013 17.946.187 449.190.979 60.089.817 620.138.995
1.934 109.046.787 18.018.060 402.526.106 66.210.668 595.801.620
1.935 123.740.046 15.823.361 303.040.363 47.732.522 490.336.293
Source: Estadística del Comercio Exterior de España.